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Abstract
In this article we assume two levels of skills and two classes of goods, one produced with a
technology requiring high skills, the other produced with a technology that can be operated by
both low and high skilled workers. Our model generates two distinct labour market regimes.
In one regime we show technical change can be the cause of wage divergence between skilled
and unskilled workers. This result is consistent with recent evidence on wage differentials.
Adding the Phillips-effect shows this wage divergence can be “traded off” against
unemployment of low skilled workers, and hence explains evidence on skill asymmetries in
unemployment. Under the alternative regime these effects do not exist but high skilled
workers may replace low skilled workers driving them out of their jobs. 
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11. Introduction
Over the past decade or so, the labour market perspectives for low skilled workers have
worsened dramatically throughout the OECD. This problem has been widely recognised and
most authors agree that the causes for this deterioration of labour market perspectives are to
be found in the changing composition of labour demand. The OECD formulated the problem
as:
  .... one of the most serious current challenges in the OECD area is the trend
shift in the composition of the demand for labour away from unskilled and
towards skilled labour. (OECD (1994))
Throughout the OECD, however, it is interesting to note the different manifestations of this
seemingly common shift in demand. 
Unemployment is high and rising relatively for low-skilled workers in Europe (OECD
(1994), Draper and Manders (1997)) as is the duration of their average unemployment spell
(Muysken en Ter Weel (1998)). At the same time we find skilled workers in jobs that do not
require their level of skill, the so called trickling down effect (CBS (1996)). 
In the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries, on the contrary, overall unemployment is at an
all time low. Low skilled workers still suffer a much higher unemployment rate relative to
their high skilled competitors (OECD (1994)). The most dramatic manifestation of the shifting
demand, however, is through relative wages. In these countries they show a very strong
tendency to diverge. A result that is almost absent in mainland Europe (OECD (1994)).
For understanding these developments two questions have to be addressed. First of all one
has to explain what may have caused the demand for low skilled labour to drop so sharply
over the eighties throughout the developed world. Then one can address the issue of the
widely different responses to this seemingly common cause. 
In this paper we will address these issues by presenting a model that shows how biased
technical change might cause the relative demand for low skilled workers to drop, but also
allows for two distinct labour market outcomes in response to this drop in relative demand.
We show that the drop in demand can cause either strong wage divergence that can partially
be traded off against asymmetric unemployment. Or it causes a trickling down effect of high
skilled workers pushing low skilled workers out of their jobs, but relative wages remain
stable.
Theoretical Background 
Two possible reasons for the drop in the demand for low skilled workers have been
distinguished in the literature. On the one hand there are those that link the shift in demand to
the process of globalization and increasing trade with low wage/low skilled countries. Key
references are Leamer (1994,1995), Burtless (1994) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). On
the other hand there are those that link this demand shift to pervasive changes in production
technology often linked to the IT-revolution. Some notable references are Krugman (1995),
Jackman (1995), Howell (1995) and Agenor and Aizenman (1996). The issue remains to be
resolved both in theoretical and empirical work on either approach. 
Both approaches, however, can be traced back in the classical economic literature. The
trade hypothesis follows from extensions and elaborations on the standard factor price
equalization theorem formulated by Stolper-Samuelson. The idea of job destruction by
Back in those days the distinction between skilled and unskilled labour was not made of course, but1
the idea of biases against one of the production factors remain valid even today.
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technical change can be traced back all the way to Ricardo’s Principles and Marx’ Capital
and the ideas of technical bias have been formalised in Hicks’ Theory of Wages.  The debate1
on the issue has never really conquered the lime light in economics but notable authors such
as Binswanger (1974a, 1974b), Kennedy (1964), Phelps (1966) and Salter (1960) have
contributed to a sizeable literature on the issue. 
From the research available so far we cannot safely disregard either hypothesis and both
will probably explain current events in the OECD partially. However in this paper we
concentrate on linking technological change to labour demand in a way that allows us to show
a possible source of bias in technical change that may cause the shift in demand. The reason
for our choice of focus is twofold. 
First we simply find the idea of biases in technical change intuitively appealing. It seems
evident from casual observation that different forms of technical change involve a particular
change in the organisation of the productive process. Introducing a new product usually
requires the set up of a whole new production line, which requires a skilled labour force that is
capable of dealing with the unforseen problems that occur during this phase of introduction
and commercialisation of the new product. As the product matures, the firm can develop and
introduce an interface that allows less skilled persons to perform the routine elements in the
production process and makes the skilled workers more productive.
Secondly the OECD (1994) presents evidence that the importance of trade in explaining the
changes in employment are but a fraction of the impact of productivity changes throughout the
OECD, which could be interpreted as evidence that technical change has a more profound
impact on labour demand in general. Furthermore the relative size of intra OECD trade to
trade with non-OECD countries seems to rule out a severe impact of wage competition from
low wage countries at the aggregate level. 
A final indication for the relative importance of the technical bias hypothesis comes from
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) who show there is also evidence of wage divergence in
developing countries. Although circumstantial this evidence supports our intuition and
justifies our choice of focus.
On the issue of different responses, notably between mainland Europe and the US, a
booming literature has developed over the last few years. Many authors have, and justly so,
looked at the differences in wage formation and labour market institutions for an explanation
(Teulings and Hartog (1998))  and indeed found that many of the differences in labour market
performance can be explained. 
Krugman (1994) was the first to address the issue and in his paper he argues Europe’s
labour market rigidities imply an adjustment to the shifting demand in unemployment,
whereas the flexible labour markets in the US translate this drop in demand into a decline in
relative (and even absolute) wages: “Moneyless America, Jobless Europe”. Appealing as this
story seems, however, it does not explain the facts.
Nickell and Bell (1995) have shown European high unemployment is not explained by a
drop in low skilled labour demand. Furthermore data from the OECD (1994) show high
absolute unemployment rates but these are not as skill biased as those in the United States as
Krugman’s analysis would predict. In this paper we therefore set out to develop a model that
provides an alternative and perhaps complementary explanation for the observed differences
in labour market responses.  
In a later stage we hope to refine the model to deal with more skill levels or a continuum of skills. This2
will hopefully increase the plausibility and intuitive appeal of our model. 
This setup is reminiscent of Krugman’s (1979) model of North-South Trade. 3
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Outline 
The challenge is now to build a model in such a way that technical change can cause both
wage divergence and low skilled unemployment or wage stability and the trickling down of
skills. In this article we assume two levels of skill  and two classes of goods, one produced2
with a highly sophisticated technology requiring high skills, the other produced with a
relatively simple technology that can be operated by both low and high skilled workers. Thus
an asymmetry in employment opportunities is assumed. 
Technical change can be introduced in the model by allowing the number of either class of
goods to increase over time. The development of new products, labelled product innovation,
causes the number of goods produced on high sophisticated technologies to increase. The
assumption is that producing a new good requires higher flexibility, higher problem solving
capabilities and more creativity: in short, higher skills on behalf of the worker. 
An expansion of the range of goods that can be produced with low skilled labour is labelled
process innovation. One could think of technical change as an improvement in the interface
between production technology and the worker, thus allowing a low skilled worker to perform
complicated tasks, previously only manageable by high skilled workers. Not only does the
interface allow low skilled workers to become productive, it also allows the high skilled
workers to be more productive than before. New goods thus mature as their interface develops
over time.3
Using this framework we show that technical change can be the prime cause of wages
diverging between skilled and unskilled workers under a particular labour market regime. A
result consistent with the empirical evidence on wage differentials in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Adding Phillips-effects to the model shows wage divergence can be “traded off” against
increasing relative unemployment of low skilled workers under this regime. This result could
explain the empirical evidence on skill asymmetries in unemployment. The model , however,
also yields a second regime in which wages do not diverge but high skilled people occupy jobs
in the low skilled sector, consistent with the evidence on employment and wage patterns on
mainland Europe. We show that under this regime a chimney effect will occur as long as skill
mismatch exists. That is, as long as high skilled workers are employed on low skilled jobs,
increasing high skilled jobs may alleviate low skilled unemployment.
The basic model with a competitive labour market is presented in section 2. The model is
extended to include unemployment in section 3, whereas in section 4 technological change is
introduced and a comparative statics analysis is presented. Finally, some concluding remarks
are made in section 5.
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Here we deviate from Krugman (1979) who assumes a one-on-one technology.4
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2. The Basic Model
General Settings
Our simple economy consists of two types of households. We have consumers that consume a
range of goods and derive utility thereof. The utility function was taken from Krugman (1979)
and has the well known “love of variety” characteristics. All consumers are assumed identical
and are represented by an individual that maximises his and therefore total utility by choosing
the appropriate levels of consumption for each good, subject to his budget constraint. 
The variety of goods is produced by a range of production units that can only be
distinguished on the basis of their technology determined input requirements. Some varieties
can only be produced by high skilled labour due to the sophistication of the production
process. Others are manufactured in a routine like manner and can thus be produced by
employing either high or low skilled workers. There are no other inputs in our model. Both
consumers and producers can only distinguish between high- and low-tech goods. Within a
class of goods, however, the goods are perfectly symmetric both in terms of utility and
production technology. 
By assuming price taking behaviour on behalf of the consumer and monopolistic price
setting by producers we find all high-tech goods command the same price, as do all low-tech
goods, within their class.
The producers set prices given demand, wages and their production technology. By the
symmetry and diminishing returns assumed within classes their decision is reduced to
choosing an average output level for high and low-tech goods, where output per variety within
a class is the same.  In the following subsections we first analyse the consumer decision and4
the producers’ decisions in isolation. Then the goods market equilibrium can be derived. By
confronting the labour demand that is derived from profit maximization with exogenous and
endogenous labour supply respectively we can close the model and analyse the impact of
technical change in comparative statics.
The Consumer Decision
Consumers maximize their utility. Assume a representative consumer whose utility is given
by:
where c  is the consumption of good i and n is the number of varieties of goods produced and i
1/1+ the elasticity of substitution between two varieties. When we distinguish between a
class of goods that can be produced using high skilled labour and one in which both types of
labour can be used, we may write this utility function also as:
cH
cL
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In a symmetric utility function consumers optimize by spreading consumption equally across all5
varieties that command the same price. Hence consumers consume the average amount of all varieties
within each class and c =(c +c +...+c )/n .H h1 h2 hnH H
>1. Some tentative evidence in Van Zon, Muysken and Meijers (1998) has shown this value is6
approximately 1.25 in the Netherlands between high and medium and medium and low level skills. 
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where subscripts H(igh) and L(ow) indicate the level of sophistication of the technology used
to produce those goods and c  and c  are the average amounts of consumption of high andH  L
low sophisticated goods, respectively.  Finally n  and n  indicate the number of varieties of5 H   L
both goods. We maximise the utility function subject to the simple (Walrasian) budget
constraint, Y= P n c  + P  n  c , where Y is income and P and P  are the price levels forH  H H  L L L       H    L
both classes of goods. Then relative average consumption of high and low-tech goods is a
function of the relative price:
The Producers and Goods Market Equilibrium
Each variety is produced in a situation of profit maximisation under imperfect competition on
the product markets (varieties are heterogenous by assumption) and perfect competition on the
labour market. Labour (measured in efficiency units) is the only factor of production
distinguished in the model. 
We identify two groups of producers. As was mentioned above, the output of a variety of
high sophisticated goods can only be produced by employing high skilled labour. High skilled
labour not employed by the high tech producers is available for the production of low
sophisticated goods as is the entire supply of low skilled labour. The output of any variety
exhibits diminishing returns in the relevant input. Due to the symmetry in production within a
class of products and the diminishing returns, the average output per variety is equal to the
output of any variety within that class. It can be written as a function of the labour input per
variety. Average output of a low sophisticated variety is given by:   
Where l = ( L + L )/n , is the labour input on all n  low sophisticated varieties measured ineL   L  HL L        L
efficiency units. L is the number of low skilled workers employed and L  is the number ofL          HL
high skilled workers on low sophisticated jobs. The latter workers are assumed to be  times
as efficient as low skilled workers.  Equivalently for all n  high sophisticated varieties output6 H
is equal to average output:
Where l  = L /n  is the amount of high skilled labour employed in the production of eachHH  HH H
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Figure 1: Goods Market Equilibrium
high tech variety. Profits for both types of producers are given by: 
Where w  and w  are the wages paid to one efficiency unit of high and low skilled labourH  L
respectively. Producers now set prices to maximise profits given the relative demand for their
product (3), the production function (4) and (5) and wages. Standard optimization yields the
profit maximizing relative average supply as a function of relative prices and wages:
Equating relative average supply (8) and demand (3) yields the relative prices as a function of
relative wages for which the goods markets clear:
Equation (9) describes the relative wage-price frontier for which the goods market is in
equilibrium. Figure 1 shows this frontier, labeled GME, is a concave line through the origin in
P,w-space, where P and w are the relative price and wage ratio respectively.
The Demand for Labour 
A similar approach can be followed to derive the relative
wage-price frontier for the labour market. Since labour is
the only factor of production in the model, it follows that
the supply of a certain type of good directly generates a
corresponding demand for the appropriate type of labour. 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the Labour Market
By substituting for output in (8) by (4) and (5), we can solve for the relative implied demand
for labour (in appropriately skilled efficiency units) as a function of the relative product
wages:
Inelastic Labour Supply and Equilibrium in the Labour Market
We now first introduce exogenous labour supply to provide a benchmark case. When labour is
supplied inelastic, relative supply in efficiency units can be written as:
Equating (10) and (11) yields the relative wage-price frontier for which the labour market is in
equilibrium:
It can be verified in equation (12) that producers will set relative prices proportional to
relative wages with a factor of proportion that depends on the relative availability of high
skilled workers and the relative size of the high skilled sector. Equation (12) can be
represented in w,P-space as well. It traces out a linear upward sloping line on which the labour
market is in equilibrium. The slope of the curve is, however, conditional upon the value for
L  and decreases as L  increases. Figure 2 shows the Labour Market Equilibrium, LME,HL    HL
conditional on L =0.HL
As we have mentioned above, L  refers to the demand for high-skilled workers on low skilledHL
jobs. It can be shown from the first order conditions for low skilled producers that these
workers will only be employed on these jobs when relative wages match relative efficiency,
LHL
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Figure 3: The Complete Specialisation Equilibrium
that is L >0 can only occur when w /w . It is profitable to replace low skilled workers withHL      H L
high skilled workers on low skilled jobs as long as the latter condition is a strict inequality. On
the other hand, high skilled wages should always exceed those for low skilled jobs, that is
w .w . Otherwise all high-skilled workers will seek employment on low skilled jobs.H L
Therefore an equilibrium with 0<L <L*  is only possible for w /w =. HL H     H L
For the relative wage equal to , equation (12) can be solved to yield skill mismatch,
L /L* , as a function of relative prices only:HL H
The left quadrant in Figure 2 shows this relationship as a downward sloping curve with a
positive intercept at the relative price level where the LME  -curve intersects w /w =. HL=0   H L
The reasoning above implies that for higher relative wages, i.e. w>, no high skilled labour
will be employed on low-skilled jobs. Therefore the LME line with L =0 will be onlyHL
relevant for w>, as is indicated by the thick line in Figure 2, from point A upwards.
The Equilibrium with Inelastic Labour Supply
In order to determine the simultaneous equilibrium of our model Figure 3 combines the goods
and labour market equilibrium wage-price frontiers. As the GME is a concave line in w,P-
space and the LME  is upward sloping and linear, we know there is a unique point ofLHL=0
intersection. From (11) we know this point of intersection moves to the right as the number of
high skilled workers in the low skilled sector increases, since this would rotate the LME curve
clockwise. This implies there are two possible equilibria in the model. 
Figure 3 shows the straightforward case where the GME-curve intersects the LME-curve
above point A, the point of intersection of the GME-curve and the line w=. In such an
equilibrium the wages paid in the high skilled sector are too high for low tech producers to
benefit from their employment. This implies they will set L  = 0 and relative wages nowHL
adjust to bring about equilibrium. The economy would remain in a point such as B and the left
quadrant shows the employment rate of high skilled workers in the low tech sector is 0. Hence
wP
LHL/L*H 
LMELHL=0
A
C
1
LMELHL=LHL*
GME
LHL*/L*H
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Figure 4: The Incomplete Specialisation Equilibrium
we label this equilibrium complete specialisation.
Another possible equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 4 and prevails when the GME-curve
intersects with the LME -curve below point A. In such an equilibrium low tech producersLHL=0
find it attractive to employ high skilled workers. In the process of competing for high skilled
workers they will drive up the relative wages until w=.  This will rotate the LME-curve to
LME . The economy reaches an equilibrium at point C, where the GME-curve intersectsLHL=LHL*
with w=. In such an equilibrium L  /L* >0 (left panel) and there is positive skill mismatchHL H 
L . We label this equilibrium incomplete specialisation.  HL*
As can be seen from equations (9) and (12), the GME-curve does not change when labour
supply or the number of varieties change, whereas the LME-curve does. That is, the LME-
curve moves clockwise both when L */L * and n /n  increase. This implies that when lowH L   L H
skilled labour is abundant, the ratio of high wages relative to low wages will be high and no
high skilled labour will be employed on low skilled jobs. As one might expect, this tendency
will be reinforced by product innovations that increase n . For such innovations increase theH
relative scarcity of high skilled labour. We will discuss the impact of technical change more in
detail in section 4.
3. Wage Formation and Unemployment 
So far we have not allowed labour supply to respond to these wage adjustments and have
assumed zero unemployment, so unemployment rates can obviously not be compared. This
issue will be addressed in the next sections by assuming endogenous labour supply and
repeating the analysis outlined above.
Wage Formation and Labour Market Equilibrium with Elastic Labour Supply
When we endogenise labour supply and allow for unemployment the results will obviously
change, although not qualitatively. We will, for the purpose of this paper, abstract from
microeconomic foundations underlying our labour supply conditions. For now we refer to f.e.
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1994) and put the exact derivation of our assumptions on the
agenda for further research. Moreover, in the Annex to this paper we present an alternative
process of wage formation which leads to results similar to the present analysis.
Here we assume a process of wage bargaining, both by high-skilled workers and by low-
skilled workers, taking each other’s wage as a reference, in the context of a right-to-manage
wH
wHL
1	uHH
1	u 
5
0<5<1 >1
wL

1

wH

1	uL
1	u 
5
For simplicity we assume that unemployment benefits are equal to the wage that would have been7
earned when working, minus benefits from leisure. Therefore being unemployed is not a threat in the
bargaining process.
Since we assume that in this wage bargaining process unemployment benefits do not pose any threat,8
high-skilled workers are indifferent between working on low skilled jobs or being unemployed.
Taking the parameters u*,  and 5 for both bargaining processes is just for convenience and does not9
alter the qualitative results. 
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model.  High skilled workers will negotiate a wage, w , for the high skilled sector taking7 H
demand for high skilled employment in that sector, L , into account and using as an outsideHH
option, the wage a high skilled worker can earn in the low skilled sector, w  = w  .TheL  HL
excess high skilled labour supply, which we assume to be the difference between exogenous
total high skilled labour supply, L *,  and the level of employment in the high skilled sector,H
will turn to the low skilled sector, where the low skilled wage is determined in a bargaining
process by low-skilled workers.
The high skilled wages bargained in the high skilled sector are given by:
where u =(L *-L )/L * is the mismatch and unemployment rate of high skilled workers andHH H HH H
u* is the exogenous rate that high-skilled workers accept when their demands are met.  The8
wage claim is a positive function of the level of employment of high skilled workers on high
skilled jobs, expressing their willingness to accept lower wages when mismatch is reduced.
Furthermore high skilled workers are assumed to take a fixed mark up, , over their outside
option as a base wage.
Low skilled workers are assumed to take the productivity adjusted high skilled wage, w /,H
as their ultimate target and will bargain for a fraction, 1/, of that target. The bargained low
skilled wage is obviously a positive function of the level of low skilled employment relative to
the reference level. Hence we assume:9
where u  = (L *-L )/L * is the low skilled unemployment rate and u* represents the exogenousL  L L L
reference unemployment rate that low skilled workers accept when their demands are met.
This equation expresses the trade off between additional unemployment and higher relative
wages low skilled workers are willing to make.
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These equations can be rewritten to give the following labour supply equations:
and:
for low and high skilled labour respectively. 
We assume high skilled workers are still allocated between the low and high tech sector,
such that L  =L   - L  holds. Therefore we can write relative labour supply per variety ins  *    sHL H   HH
efficiency units as:
This is the endogenous relative supply version of equation (11). Confronting this with total
labour demand as in equation (10) we find the relation between relative prices and relative
wages for which the labour market is in equilibrium. Again the resulting LME-curve is
conditional on the level of L :HL
The analysis is less straightforward in this case since under our assumptions on the wage
formation process the supply of high skilled labour on high skilled jobs is bound to a
minimum level of employment at a relative wage of . This implies that L  is bound by aHL
maximum under incomplete specialisation and an equilibrium is no longer guaranteed to exist.
We assume, however, that this constraint does not become binding and the high skilled labour
market can be induced to release labour into the low skilled jobs at the relative wage 
sufficiently to achieve equilibrium. In Figure 5 we have presented the LME-curves conditional
on L =0 and L =L . It can be easily verified that both trace out an upward slopingHL   HL HLmax
convex curve through the origin. Hence there will be one unique point of intersection with the
GME-curve in the positive w,P-plane. In the upper left quadrant we again show skill mismatch
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Figure 5:
 Labour Market Equilibrium with Endogenous Supply
Figure 6: Possible Equilibria with Endogenous Labour Supply
as a function of relative prices (by setting relative wages equal to  in (19) ). We can now turn
 
to the equilibrium on both the goods market and the labour market.
Equilibrium with Unemployment
Again two equilibria are possible. In Figure 6 we have combined Figure 1 and Figure 5 to
show these possible equilibria. When the intersection of GME and LME lies above A again we
end up in a complete specialisation equilibrium. As we know high skilled employment in the
low skilled sector is zero under this regime, the rate u  can be interpreted as theHH
unemployment rate for high skilled workers, that can be calculated from (14). The equilibrium
unemployment rate for low skilled workers follows in a similar fashion directly from (15).
Figure 7 shows these unemployment rates as a function of the equilibrium relative wage. By
assuming the same parameters in both wage equations we obtain the result that the curves
intersect at w=, i.e. beyond w=. Furthermore we can establish that for large enough w
unemployment for high skilled workers is zero.
When the intersection of LME and GME lies below point A in Figure 6 again low tech
producers will hire high skilled workers, causing the LME-curve to rotate clockwise until
relative wages have increased up to . Ultimately the economy is in equilibrium at point C. As
before under this regime high skilled workers occupy low skilled jobs as can be seen in the
upper left quadrant, and we have incomplete specialisation. To analyse the unemployment
rates under this equilibrium we use equations (14) and (15) and the employment rate for high
skilled on low skilled jobs. Low skilled unemployment follows directly from setting w= in
(15) and is constant under this regime. The high skilled unemployment rate follows from
w
uL,H
uL
uH

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1
(1-u*)^-5
P
uL,H
uH
1
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uHH
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The figure can be extended beyond P , then it will be analogous to Figure 7.10 A
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Figure 7: Unemployment for High and Low Skilled Labour under
Complete Specialisation
Figure
 
8: Unemployment for High and Low Skilled Labour under
Incomplete Specialisation
subtracting the employed mismatch, obtained by setting w= in (19), from the supplied
mismatch u  under w=. The latter is a constant and since the former is a decreasing functionHH
of relative prices - cf. the function e  in Figure 8 - we can analyse the equilibriumHH
unemployment rates in P,u-space. Figure 8 presents both unemployment rates under
incomplete specialisation . We do not consider the possibility that u  is negative (low skilled10 H
producers cannot find high skilled workers to meet their demand) for this would only occur
when the low tech product range is extremely large and the low skilled labour force is
extremely small relative to the high skilled product range and labour force respectively.
In Figure 6 we show that compared to the incomplete specialisation equilibrium wages
have diverged under complete specialisation. By the convexity of the LME-curve, however,
we also know that wages have not diverged as much as in the model with exogenous labour
supply. Relative unemployment rates might or might not have diverged between these
regimes. Figure 7 shows unemployment rates move in favour of high skilled workers as wages
diverge. Hence we may conclude unemployment rates can indeed be traded off against wage
divergence under this regime. It depends on the parameters of the model where most of the
adjustment to equilibrium arises. In the next section we will turn to the comparative statics of
the model, when we allow for technical change.
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4. Comparative Statics; Introducing Technical Change
In this section we introduce technical change into the model to see how it may explain the
empirical evidence referred to in the introduction. First we define technical change in our
model as the expansion of either range of product varieties. Increasing the total range of
varieties implies introducing new products into the economy, which we label product inno-
vation. 
These new products are both in terms of utility and production technology perfectly
symmetric to the already existing products in the range n . By our assumption of love ofH
variety, consumers will respond to the introduction of these new products by keeping their
average consumption of all products in the n  range constant given the relative prices.H
However, these prices might change since the production of the additional new goods requires
the allocation of high skilled labour to the new firms and hence high skilled wages will tend to
increase. Since relative prices are a mark up over relative wages by equation (9) this causes
relative prices to increase as well. 
There may, however, be a reserve of high skilled labour in low skilled jobs. The high
skilled labour will be attracted by the higher relative wage. This inflow can offset the upward
pressure on wages in the high skilled sector and create an upward pressure in the low skilled
labour market. Hence relative wages can remain stable when the movement of high skilled
labour can offset the initial shock. Both high and low skilled wages rise proportionally under
such an adjustment.
When such a reserve of mismatched labour is unavailable or insufficient to absorb the
shock, high skilled wages will increase relative to low skilled wages and hence relative prices
rise as well. This causes consumers to reduce their average consumption of high tech products
and increase the average consumption of low tech products. As a consequence marginal
productivity moves in favour of high skilled workers, which brings relative marginal
productivity in line with the higher relative wages.
The other type of technical change we can distinguish is the development of processes and
interfaces that allow low skilled workers to produce products that required high skills before.
We label these process innovations. In our model this implies an increase in the range n  and aL
corresponding decrease in n . In our model this will cause exactly the opposite of the above.H
Consumers will keep the average consumption of products in the range n  constant givenL
relative prices and hence the demand for low skilled efficiency units increases. When there
exists a positive mismatch at the outset, relative wages are at . Hence low tech producers can
compete for additional high skilled labour in the high skilled labour market. This implies an
outflow of high skilled labour from the high skilled sector that puts an upward pressure on
high skilled wages as well. A new equilibrium is reached when enough high skilled labour has
moved to low skilled jobs to produce the additional output. Wages again rise in proportion
and hence relative wages remain stable (at ) as do relative prices.
LHL/L*H w
P

LME
A
B
C
A’
C’
LME’
We assume for now the adjustment to equilibrium does not cause the relative price to fall below the11
critical relative price level for which no further high skilled employment can be attracted by the low
sector producers at a relative wage .
The latter, provided C lies above w=..12
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Figure 9: Comparative Statics, an increase in nH
When there is no initial mismatch low skilled wages increase and relative wages decrease.
This will cause relative prices to drop as well and consumers lower the average consumption
of products in the n  range in response. When this relative wage change is sufficient to absorbL
the initial shock no mismatch will occur in the new equilibrium. However, one should note
that relative wages cannot fall below  without provoking the inflow of high skilled labour
from the high skilled sector.
Figure 9 can be used to illustrate the analysis above. As can be verified in equation (19) an
increase in n  causes a clockwise rotation in the LME -curve.  This implies point A movesH       HL=0 11
down to A’ and the intersection of GME and LME moves to the right and up to C’. Under
complete specialisation this implies higher relative prices, higher relative wages and
divergence in unemployment rates.  Under incomplete specialisation the rotation may lead to12
a regime shift. Then the previously mentioned price, wage and unemployment responses
occur. When the shock is insufficient to induce a regime shift, the adjustment to equilibrium
implies a reduction in L /L*   as can be verified in the upper left quadrant. The effects of anHL H
increase in n  do exactly the opposite.L
Now we make a tentative link to empirical observation. Our model distinguishes two
possible equilibria. Under incomplete specialisation we see positive skill mismatch that is
reduced when product innovations are introduced. Relative wages remain stable, however, and
thus relative unemployment does so to. This corresponds nicely with the findings on mainland
Europe, where skill mismatch seems to be on the retreat and relative wages and
unemployment rates do not show significant divergence. A possible explanation for the fact
that Europe is in incomplete specialisation is the high minimum wages for low skilled labour
and the policies to moderate high skilled wages. Although not analysed in this paper, such
policies would push high skilled workers into the low skilled jobs. Our model does predict,
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however, that this stability of relative wages and unemployment will not last as the skill
intensive sector expands.
Under complete specialisation our model predicts that increases in the range of skill
intensive goods will cause wage divergence and divergence of unemployment rates. Mismatch
is absent in this regime. This situation might apply to the United States, the United Kingdom
and most countries in the British Commonwealth. In these countries mismatch is apparently
not considered a big problem since hardly any attention is devoted to it in economic literature.
Wage divergence and real wage decreases for low skilled workers, however, is al the more
important and Nickell and Bell (1995) show biases in labour demand account for a large part
of the asymmetry in unemployment in these countries counter to Krugman’s analysis.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a model that generates two possible equilibria. Using the
characteristics of these equilibria we can identify the regime of incomplete specialisation with
mainland Europe whereas the Anglo-Saxon world seems to be completely specialised. This
implies that both will respond differently to similar technological shocks. 
A surge in the development of new products, that remains to be shown over the last
decades but can certainly not be dismissed beforehand, can explain wage divergence and
increasing asymmetries in unemployment in the Anglo-Saxon world whereas it also causes a
decrease in skill mismatch in mainland Europe. We do acknowledge there are many more
differences between and within these area’s of the OECD and do not intend to explain all of
the differences in labour market performance solely from this point of view. We do, however,
contend that biased technical change can be a common cause without causing the same
effects. 
Furthermore our analysis sheds a different light on the policies implemented in the area’s
distinguished above. Relying on the so called chimney-effect to improve labour market
perspectives for low skilled workers in Europe will eventually be self-defeating as complete
specialisation is achieved. The undesirable side effects of such a regime are to be considered
in formulating such policies. Policies of wage moderation do improve the situation for low
skilled workers but imply welfare losses due to inefficient allocation of skills.
As to the US policy of promoting technical change and R&D to create jobs for the
unskilled, this may actually backfire. promoting R&D in general may increase the
development and introduction of new products and cause an aggravation of the problem.
Technology policy cannot, however, be evaluated without introducing an explicit R&D sector
into the model. we therefore put this at the top of our research agenda. For now we suffice by
concluding the R&D policy should be targeted in order to deal with the problem of
asymmetric unemployment and wage divergence.    
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For simplicity we assume that unemployment benefits are equal to the wage that would have been13
earned when working, minus benefits from leisure. Therefore being unemployed is not a threat in the
bargaining process.
Equation (A3) can also be written as:14
which is very similar to (14).
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(A2)
(A3)
Annex: Alternative for the wage formation process
The aim of this Annex is to present a wage formation process which is different from the
process presented in the text above, but none-the-less yields a LME-curve with similar
properties. This intends to illustrate the rather general nature of our analysis.
Assume that both high and low skilled wages are set by unions in a context of a right-to-
manage model That is, wages are set such that the utility of the union is maximised given the
implications for demand for labour- cf. equations (9') and (10).
The union that represents high skilled workers is assumed to desire the highest possible
wage for it’s members, but this wage must always exceed the low skilled wage by some factor
>1 to compensate for the costs of acquiring the higher skills. Hence w=w /w >, should holdH L
at all times.  Moreover, high skilled employment is valued with an intensity ! relative to13
wages and we assume, some minimum acceptable level of employment, defined as a share 
of the “natural”employment level (1-u*)L *. The union utility function is thus given by:H
The equilibrium demand for labour can be expressed as a function of relative wages by
combining (9) and (10), which yields:
The union is assumed to take the average employment level in the other sector as given.
Hence maximising utility with respect to relative wages subject to the demand for labour in
equation (A2) yields:14
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Taking the parameters u*,  and 5 for both bargaining processes is just for convenience and does not15
alter the qualitative results. 
However, the low-skilled workers ignore the potential presence of high-skilled workers on low skilled16
jobs.
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(A4)
(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
Preferences for the union representing the low skilled workers similarly express a desire for a
highest possible wage, which must exceed their outside option, the unemployment benefit, w ,u
by at least a factor  to compensate them for the leisure lost.  Hence w -w  > 0 at all times.15 L u
Assuming unemployment benefits are a constant fraction  of low skilled wages, substituing
for unemployment benefits and multiplying and dividing by the high skilled wage yields the
excess of low skilled wages over their minimum acceptable wage as w (1-)w . Like in theH -1
case of the union for high skilled labour we assume the union for low skilled labour also cares
for employment.  Moreover we assume for simplicity employment enters the union utility16
function in the same way as for the high skilled workers union:
Again we find the equilibrium demand for labour from combining (9') and (10):
Since the low skilled union takes the level of high skilled wages and average high skilled
employment as exogenous, maximising the utility function with respect to relative wages
given labour demand yields:
Finally we assume that in equilibrium L =L +L  holds, hence employers in the low skilledLe L HL
sector are assumed to be indifferent between high or low skilled labour, measured in
efficiency units. Combining equations (A3) and (A6) yields the relative aggregate supply of
labour:
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(A8)
(A9)
Confronting this expression with the aggregate version of (10):
yields the LME-curve:
It can be shown that LME-curve essentially has the same properties as the LME-curve in (19).
Both the first and second derivative with respect to w are positive under our parameter
restrictions, implying the LME-curve is upward sloping and convex in P,w-space. The analysis
then can be pursued along the lines after equation (19) in the text.
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